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 The past 15 years have seen an enormous increase in stock-based and option-based 
executive compensation.  The median exposure of CEO wealth to firm stock price tripled 
between 1980 and 1994, and doubled again between 1994 and 20001.  The firms responsible for 
this change often described the increase in CEO exposure to stock prices as a way to align upper 
management incentives with the interests of shareholders.  This strategy may, however, have had 
mixed results.  In particular, it has recently been suggested that large option packages increased 
the incentives for managers to manipulate their firms’ reported earnings.2   
The use of accruals to temporarily boost or reduce reported income is one mechanism for 
earnings management.  Accruals are components of earnings that are not reflected in current cash 
flows, and a great deal of managerial discretion goes into their construction.  As Figure 1 shows, 
accruals (normalized by firm assets) have increased significantly over the past 20 years.  This 
increase has been especially rapid since 1995.  This paper uses cross-sectional data from the 
1990s to assess whether the increasing use of accruals was related to the increase in stock-based 
CEO compensation. 
Xerox is an example of a company where executives appear to have manipulated reported 
income during the 1990s.  During this period, the firm’s CEO was exercising large amounts of 
stock options and selling large numbers of shares.  In April 2002 the SEC sued Xerox for 
manipulating reported earnings and revenues, and as part of the settlement with the SEC Xerox 
was forced to restate reported revenues for the period between 1997 and 2001.  This restatement 
reduced reported revenue by $2.1 billion and reducing reported net income by $1.4 billion.   The 
SEC’s lawsuit accused Xerox of using a variety of tricks to inflate net income, including 
inappropriately allocating the revenue stream on their equipment leases. Xerox’s accounting 
choices were inconsistent with GAAP and significantly inflated the company’s reported 
                                                 
1 See Hall and Liebman (1998). 
2 See, for example, the 9 January 2004 New York Times article by Gretchen Morgenson: ‘Options packages 
encourage executives to fiddle books.’ 
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earnings.3  During this period, the value of options exercised by the Xerox CEO was over $20 
million, almost three times the value of options exercised over the prior five years.  Xerox is not 
the only company where inflated earnings coincided with significant option exercises and share 
sales; other examples include Waste Management, Tyco, and Enron.    
This paper uses data from the Compustat and and Compustat Executive Compensation 
datasets to find evidence that more ‘incentivized’ CEOs—those whose overall compensation is 
more sensitive to company share prices—lead companies with higher levels of earnings 
management.  These CEOs appear to more aggressively use discretionary components of earnings 
to affect their firms’ reported performance.  In addition, CEOs exercise unusually large amounts 
of options and sell unusually large quantities of their firms’ shares during years where accruals 
make up a large part of their firms’ reported earnings.  These findings relate to work on the 
accruals anomaly documented by Sloan (1996) and Collins and Hribar (2000), and also extend 
work by Beneish and Vargus (2002) on insider trading, accruals, and returns.   
 This paper proceeds in four sections.  The first section provides a description of the 
changing structure of executive compensation during the 1980s and 1990s, and discusses existing 
evidence on earnings management. The second section introduces the data used in the paper, and 
discusses the empirical approach. The third section presents empirical results. A final section 
concludes and discusses directions for future research. 
1. Background on executive pay and earnings management 
The central tension in the corporate governance literature is the conflict of interest 
between firms’ dispersed owner-investors and the managers hired to determine firms’ investment 
projects and payout decisions.  Jensen and Murphy (1990) showed that on average, CEOs enjoyed 
a $3 increase in the value of their stock and option portfolios for every $1000 increase in 
                                                 
3 See the GAO’s 2002 publication: ‘Report to the Chairman, Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs: Financial Statement Restatements’, available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03138.pdf; see 
also the SEC’s news release regarding the Xerox settlement, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/headlines/xeroxsettles.htm.   
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shareholder wealth, suggesting that CEOs had little incentive to maximize shareholder value.4  
Indeed, Jensen (1993) presents evidence that excessive R&D and capital investment during the 
1980s destroyed at least $10 billion each at companies including General Motors, Ford, British 
Petroleum, Chevron, and DuPont.  On the other hand, there is some evidence that increasing 
managers’ equity-based incentives creates value: Mehran (1995) finds that firm performance is 
positively related to the share of equity held by managers and the share of manager compensation 
that is equity-based.5  
Direct CEO exposure to the stock prices of their companies increased dramatically during 
the 1990s.  Hall and Liebman (1998) show that the median exposure of CEO wealth to firm value 
tripled between 1980 and 1994.  This change came in response to the belief that managers were 
under-incentivized, as well as to changes in the tax code that increased the attractiveness of 
performance-based compensation such as grants of stock and options.6  These changes may have 
discouraged certain types of wasteful ‘empire-building’, such as those documented by Jensen 
(1993).  This paper presents evidence, however, that highly-incentivized CEOs also engaged in 
higher levels of earnings manipulation. 
                                                 
4  An implication of their finding was that a CEO might choose to undertake a project that would cost 
shareholders $1.00 but bring $0.004 in private benefits.  Certainly managers look beyond the narrow 
impact of share price changes on the value of their existing portfolios; career concerns, potential future 
salary increases, and the social norms and institutional environment of firms all help to motivate behavior 
consistent with the aims of investors.  Jensen and Murphy’s line of research, however, helped crystallize a 
sense that managers’ financial insulation from the stock prices of their companies led to value-destroying 
behavior.  Stories from this period described managers so heedless of shareholder interests that they built 
‘empires’ and engaged in other wasteful projects. 
5 A key weakness of Mehran’s empirical approach is that he takes executive exposure to the stock price as 
exogenous.  See Palia (2001) for an approach that takes CEO incentives as endogenous.  His analysis 
suggests that the cross-sectional relationship between Q and managerial incentives reflects underlying firm 
characteristics, and does not imply that firms, in equilibrium, could increase their value by increasing the 
power of their executives’ incentives. 
6 The relevant tax law change was the introduction of Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code, 
legislated in 1993.  This section placed a $1 million cap on the deductibility of executive compensation 
from corporate income taxes, and significantly raised the effective tax rate on executive salary in excess of 
$1 million for any corporation facing positive marginal tax rates.  Compensation that is substantially 
‘performance based’, such as bonuses or grants of stock and stock options, was exempted from this non-
deductibility provision.  See Rose and Wolfram (2002) for a discussion of the relationship between these 
tax code changes and executive compensation. 
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The opportunity to ‘manage’ earnings arises in part because reported income includes 
both cash flows and changes in firm value that are not reflected in current cash flows.  While cash 
flows are relatively easy to measure, computing the change in firm value that is not reflected in 
current cash flows often involves a great deal of discretion.  The accruals components of income 
capture the wedge between firms’ cash flows and income.  
For instance, consider a firm that owns a finite-lived goose, laying golden eggs.  While 
cash may have been used for the initial purchase of the goose, accrual accounting attempts to 
match this initial outflow against the future inflows from this investment.  The cost of the goose is 
thus spread over current and future periods.  In any particular period, the firm sells the eggs, and 
(assuming for the moment that customers pay in cash) the cash flows of the firm are the payments 
for these golden eggs.  But the firm has also used up a finite-lived resource, a fact not reflected in 
current cash flows.  A true picture of the firm’s income requires an adjustment for the use of the 
goose, and thus the difference between cash flows and earnings reflects the depreciation of the 
firm’s asset during the period.  And conditional on cash flow, the firm can reduce or increase its 
reported earnings by assuming a higher or lower rate of deprecation.7 
Continuing with this example, suppose the firm’s customers buy golden eggs on credit 
extended by the firm.  Selling goods on credit, the firm has no cash inflow during the period.  The 
firm now possesses promises from customers to pay later; while these promises are valuable, 
deciding their value requires judgment.  In particular, with credit sales, constructing income 
requires making assumptions about the speed with which customers will pay and the share of 
customers that will eventually default.   These decisions influence the firm’s current reported 
                                                 
7 Another method of manipulating earnings is to take expenses that are not reasonably expected to generate 
future cash inflows and label them as investment.  Worldcom, which capitalized operating expenses, is a 
striking example of the misapplication of accrual accounting. 
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income, and the discretion that managers enjoy creates a potential setting for the manipulation of 
reported earnings.8 
Researchers in the accounting literature have often focused on earnings management by 
managers seeking to hit explicit bonus-linked targets for reported income.  Healy (1985) presents 
evidence that the accruals policies of managers are related to the nonlinear incentives inherent in 
their bonus contracts.  Gaver, Gaver, and Austin (1996) find evidence of earnings management 
consistent with income smoothing, as do Burgstahler and Dichev (1997).  Such behavior would 
make sense for managers whose bonus-linked incentives are focused on meeting explicit targets 
for earnings.  Burgstahler and Dichev, in particular, show that firms avoid negative earnings; they 
present nonparametric evidence that the distribution of earnings is ‘bunched’ just above zero.9   
While Healy (1985)’s original contribution was to document that managers manipulate 
earnings to ‘game’ bonus schemes, later work by Sloan (1996) and Collins and Hribar (2000) 
provides evidence that managers may be able to ‘game’ the capital markets as well10.  These 
authors document an apparent accruals anomaly in financial markets.  The market appears to have 
consistently overestimated the persistence of the accruals components of earnings, and therefore 
to overprice them.  Collins and Hribar suggest that a hedge portfolio strategy exploiting the 
overvaluation of accruals earned abnormal two-quarter holding period returns of approximately 6 
percent over the period between 1988 and 1997.  This implies that managers may potentially have 
been able, during this period, to use accruals to manipulate the markets’ valuation of their firms.  
                                                 
8 Though not part of accruals, managers also enjoy discretion in reporting the cost of sponsoring defined 
benefit pension plans.  In particular, firms decide at the beginning of the year what rate of return to assume 
on the assets that back its pension plan.  Regardless of the actual realized rate of return on these assets, the 
firm can continue to use this assumed rate in computing income.  Differences between assumed and actual 
returns on pension assets can be amortized over long periods of time.  See Bergstresser, Desai, and Rauh 
(2004) for more information on earnings management in defined benefit pension plans.   
9 See also Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1999), who show that the distribution of earnings bunches at a 
number of points:  above zero earnings, above the level of earnings necessary to have stable or growing 
earnings, and above analysts’ forecasts.   
10 Potential market-based incentives for this type of behavior are discussed in Barth et al (1995).  They 
show that firms with a consistent pattern of earnings increases appear to trade at a premium.   
‘CEO incentives…’  Page 7 12/4/2004 
In particular, CEOs may have been able to sell some of their positions in company stock before 
the anomalous returns to accruals disappeared.11   
There is also evidence that managers manipulate earnings during periods when they or 
their companies are selling shares to capital markets.  Beneish and Vargus (2002) analyze 
accruals, insider sales, and subsequent earnings.  They find that periods of very high accruals are 
associated with sales of shares by insiders, and they find that low earnings and stock returns 
follow the periods of high accruals that are accompanied by insider sales.  Bergstresser, Desai, 
and Rauh (2004) show that firms with defined benefit pension plans make particularly aggressive 
assumptions about these plans’ returns during periods where their executives are exercising stock 
options.  A set of papers from Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a,1998b), show that initial and 
secondary public offerings of shares by firms that appear to have manipulated earnings around the 
offering year see substantially worse performance than other offerings.  Finally, Burns and Kedia 
(2003) find that earnings restatements are more common at firms where CEOs have larger options 
portfolios. 
This paper presents evidence that accruals-based measures of earnings management are 
higher at firms with higher levels of stock-based incentives.  This result complements the existing 
literature, in particular the papers by Burns and Kedia and Beneish and Vargus.  Burns and Kedia 
focus on earnings restatements; our paper complements theirs by focusing on accruals-based 
measures of earnings management.  In addition, the finding that periods of high accruals coincide 
with high levels of CEO option exercise and higher levels of CEO and insider share sale extends 
and complements Beneish and Vargus (2001).  This paper extends one part of their results by 
focusing on a variety of measures of insider option exercise and share sales, and by presenting an 
analysis of insider sales that controls explicitly for firm characteristics.   
 
                                                 
11 See Xie (2001), who suggests that this result comes largely from the discretionary part of accruals.  See 
also Yablon and Hill (2001) for a discussion of how the channels available for managers to manipulate 
earnings are generally ‘either legal or effectively insulated from legal regress.’ 
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2. Methods and data 
This section documents data construction of our main variables: accruals, CEO 
incentives, and CEO option exercise and share sales.  The accruals measures are based on the 
Compustat dataset, which samples publicly-held corporations and contains financial information 
based on public filings.  In addition to accruals, we construct firm-year level measures of 
earnings, cash flows, firm age, and firm industrial classification.  Measures of CEO incentives 
and measures of CEO option exercise are based on the Executive Compensation database.  
Finally, data on purchases and sales of shares by executives come from SEC insider filings, 
available through Thomson Financial.   
2.1. Accruals.  
We use data from firms’ reported income statements to compute accruals measures.   Our 
methods closely follow those of Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995).  Specifically, we calculate 
total accruals as the difference between earnings and cash flows from operations:  
1,,,,,,, /)()1.3( −−∆+∆−∆−∆= tititititititi ADepSTDCashCLCATA  
TA represents the total accruals of firm i at time t, and the ∆ operator represents a one-year 
change in a variable.  The components of accruals include: ∆CAi,t, the change in the current assets 
of firm i at time t (Compustat data item 4); ∆CLi,t, the change in current liabilities (Compustat 
data item 5); ∆Cashi,t, the change in cash holdings (Compustat data item 1); and ∆STDi,t, the 
change in long-term debt in current liabilities (Compustat data item 34).  Including ∆STDi,t 
removes the portion of ∆CLi,t that comes from the maturation of the firm’s existing long-term 
debt.   Depit is the depreciation and amortization expense of the firm (Compustat data item 14), 
and Ai,t-1 is the lagged size (in assets) of firm i at time t (Compustat data item 6).   
 We primarily use TAi,t and |TAi,t| as measures of earnings manipulation.  Since earnings 
management involves the transfer of earnings from one period to another, the |TAi,t| measure of 
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accruals measures the total amount of earnings transfer without being sensitive to the precise 
timing of when earnings are increased or decreased.   
 Following Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995), this paper also remove components of 
accruals that are ‘nondiscretionary’, or beyond the control of the CEO.   We use a version of the 
Jones (1991) model of accruals, which estimates nondiscretionary accruals as the fitted value 
from a regression of total accruals on lagged firm size, the change in firm sales, and gross 
property plant and equipment scaled by total firm assets.  We estimate the following model:    
tititititi PPEREVATA ,,3,21,10, )()()/1()2.3( εαααα +×+∆×+×+= −  
The estimated coefficients are then used to construct nondiscretionary accruals according to 
equation (3.3):  
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The variable ∆REVi,t is the change in sales (normalized by lagged assets) at firm i at time t, and 
PPE is gross property plant, and equipment, again normalized by firm assets.  Estimating the 
model (3.2) on the entire Compustat sample back to 1976, using TA as the dependent variable, 
yields coefficients that can be applied to current observations to construct a measure of non-
discretionary accruals.  This measure of non-discretionary accruals implies a level of 
discretionary accruals, as in equation (3.4) below.12   
                                                 
12 We have also applied versions of this model that are modified to allow more flexibility with respect to 
time period and industry.  First, we run models allowing for dummy variables by year:   
ti
yyear
ytitititi PPEREVATA ,,3,21,10, )()()/1()'2.3( εγαααα +⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛+×+∆×+×+= ∑
=
−
 
We apply as well a version of equation (3.2’) that interacts coefficients with year dummy variables:  
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We also run a version of equation (3.2’) which allows for different coefficients by industrial classification, 
using a 12-classification industry breakdown: 
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We also explored using a version of the ‘Modified Jones’ model, substituting the change in sales 
less the change in receivables: (∆REVi,t – ∆RECi,t) for the change in sales in equation (3.2):   
tititititi
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The results using discretionary accruals based on the Modified Jones model were similar to the 
results using the Jones model and omitted for brevity.   
 The approaches outlined above estimate accruals using changes between successive years 
in firms’ balance sheet items.  However, problems can arise when using balance sheet 
information to construct measures of accruals.  Hribar and Collins (2001) point out that using 
successive year balance sheet variables to measure earnings management creates potential 
problems around ‘non-articulation’ dates, such as mergers and acquisitions.  They propose two 
measures of earnings management that are immune to the ‘non-articulation’ problem. Both 
measures are based on information reported in firms’ cash flow statements.  The first measure is 
the difference between reported earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations 
(Compustat data item 123) and operating cash flows from continuing operations (Compustat item 
308 – Compustat item 124):   
1,,,, /)()7.3( −−= tititiCFti ACFOEBXITA  
                                                                                                                                                 
As noted in the next section, the results from models based on (3.2’)-(3.2’’’) are similar enough to results 
based on (3.2) that they have been suppressed for the sake of brevity.  These results are available from the 
authors by request.   
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This paper uses this measure, which we call TACF because it is based on data from the statement 
of cash flows.  This measure is conceptually similar to the balance-sheet accruals measure 
introduced earlier, in that it captures the difference between earnings and cash flows.  The 
important difference is that it is computed based on data from the income statement and the 
statement of cash flows and is therefore not subject to the ‘non-articulation’ problem.13   
2.2. Executive incentives 
This paper assesses relationship between earnings manipulation and the power of CEO 
equity-based incentives.  Our measure of the power of CEO incentives is based on a measure of 
the dollar change in the value of a CEO’s stock and options holdings that would come from a one 
percentage point increase in company stock price.  We construct this measure using the 
Compustat Executive Compensation data on CEO stock holdings and option holdings.  Our 
measure ONEPCT is constructed as in (3.8) below:  
)(*01.0)8.3( ,,,, titititi OPTIONSSHARESPRICEONEPCT +×=  
PRICE is the company share price, SHARES is the number of shares held by the CEO, and 
OPTIONS is the number of options held by the CEO.  We then use ONEPCT to calculate the 
variable INCENTIVE_RATIO.  This measure of incentives is normalized in a way that captures 
the share of a hypothetical CEO’s total compensation that would come from a one percentage 
point increase in the value of the equity of his company.  This incentivization measure is below:   
)/(_)9.3( ,,,,, tititititi BONUSSALARYONEPCTONEPCTRATIOINCENTIVE ++=  
  
                                                 
13 Phillips, Pincus, and Rego (2003) propose using deferred tax expense as a signal of earnings 
management.  Deferred tax expenses arise when book earnings are accelerated relative to tax earnings, 
which can be consistent with earnings management.  We explored this measure as well; results using 
deferred tax expense and a second Hribar and Collins measure were similar to results using TACF and are 
available from this authors upon request.   
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 The measures above are based on the implicit assumption that the ‘delta’ of the options in 
the CEO’s portfolio is one.  In other words, these measures assume that a dollar increase in the 
price of a firm’s shares translates one-for-one to the value of an option.  While this is 
approximately true for options that are deep in the money, it is a less accurate assumption for 
options that are out of the money.  To more closely match the delta of out-of-the-money options, 
we also use a measure of the ‘delta’ of the CEO’s option portfolio that follows the Core and Guay 
(2002) approach.  This approach estimates the delta of the option portfolio by dividing the CEO’s 
options into three groups:  those awarded in the current year, those awarded in previous years but 
not yet exercisable, and those which are currently exercisable.  For each group, measures of the 
exercise price and other variables in the Black-Scholes option formula are taken or constructed 
from the Execucomp dataset.  We use the Core-Guay measure of option delta as well, and we 
denote the ‘ONEPCT’ measure based on the Core-Guay technique ONEPCTCG.  We use this 
measure to construct the incentive ratio, as well:  
)/(_)11.3( ,,,,, tititi
CG
ti
CG
ti
CG BONUSSALARYONEPCTONEPCTRATIOINCENTIVE ++=
 
In addition to assessing the relationship between CEO equity-based incentives and 
earnings manipulation, this paper also looks at the relationship between high-accrual periods and  
executive option exercises and share sales.  The primary measure of CEO selling activity is the 
value of CEO option exercise, normalized by firm value.  We test whether selling activity, 
captured by this CEO exercise variable, is particularly pronounced during periods of high 
accruals. Our maintained assumption, supported by Ofek and Yermack (2000), is that 
executives sell the shares arising from option exercises.14   
                                                 
14 Ofek and Yermack (2000), looking at US executives, document that nearly all executive stock option 
exercises are followed by share sales.  This result may not generalize internationally, however; Kyriacou 
and Mase (2004) find that executives in the UK sell, on average, only half of the shares from the options 
exercised.   
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 We also use measures of share sales taken from the Thomson Financial data on firm 
insider transactions.  Insider trade data from Thomson are available as far back as the 1980s, but 
we start the sample at 1993 because executives’ positions within the company are not reliably 
identified until relatively recently.15  We create four measures of CEO and insider sales: the gross 
number of shares sold by the CEO normalized by the number of shares outstanding; net sales of 
shares by the CEO as a share of outstanding shares; and gross and net sales of shares normalized 
by outstanding shares for executives identified as holding one of five senior positions (CEO, 
COO, CFO, President, and Chairman) in each year.  Because the coverage of the Thomson 
dataset extends to firms smaller than the Executive Compensation dataset, using the Thomson 
data expands the analysis to a broader sample of corporations.   
3. Results  
The results in this section are divided into two subsections.  Subsection 3.1 evaluates the 
relationship between CEO financial incentives and earnings management across companies 
during the 1990s.  We find that accruals are more actively used at firms where the compensation 
of the CEO is more closely linked to the value of the stock.   
Subsection 3.2. uses a variety of measures of insider option exercise and share sales to 
document that periods when accruals are high (our proxy for periods when earnings management 
is being used to boost current reported income) are periods when CEOs and other insiders are 
selling shares and exercising options.   
Taken together, these results suggest a dark side to the increasing equity of equity-based 
incentives in executive compensation.  Highly incentivized executives appear more likely to 
manipulate reported measures of corporate performance, and appear to be liquidating stakes in 
their companies when their reported earnings are artificially high.   
3.1. CEO Incentives and earnings management 
                                                 
15 The reliability with which insiders’ positions are identified within the company increases over time.  The  
results in this paper are not highly sensitive to the choice of when to start the sample.   
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Because earnings manipulation involves both positive and negative values of accruals, 
the results in this section fit regressions of the absolute value of total accruals (|TA|) on measures 
of CEO incentives: 
titititi XRATIOINCENTIVETA ,,1,, '_)3.4( εβα +Γ+×+= −  
 Table 2a presents the results for firms with assets below $1 billion, and table 2b for firms 
with assets above $1 billion16.  We run separate regressions for small and large firms because, 
even though the results are qualitatively similar, the data reject the equality of coefficients 
between these two groups.  Unless otherwise noted, the variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles (calculated annually) in all equations.  This approach reduces the influence of outlier 
observations.  Table 1a and 1b present summary statistics for the samples used in our analysis. 
Column 1 of Table 2a presents results based on equation (4.3) estimated without control 
variables.  Without controls, the coefficient on the INCENTIVE_RATIO variable suggests that a 
1 percentage point increase in this ratio is associated with an 11 basis point increase in the 
absolute value of firm financial accruals.  A movement from the 25th percentile of 
INCENTIVE_RATIO (8.3 percent) to the 75th percentile (34.5 percent) would be associated with 
a 300 basis point increase in the absolute value of accruals over assets.   
  Adding control variables reduces the coefficient but does not affect the statistical 
significance of the result.  We control for firm size, firm governance, firm age, lagged leverage, 
lagged volatility of sales, year and industry dummies, 10 deciles of market to book, and dummy 
variables for the stock exchange on which the firm’s shares trade.  The estimated coefficient 
remains statistically significant, and suggests that a movement from the 25th to the 75th percentile 
                                                 
16 We use a cutoff of 1 billions of 1996 dollars for assets. This cutoff is not the same that we used to 
construct figure 1, because the samples are different: Figure 1 uses all firms for which Compustat data are 
available, while Table 2 uses only firms that have data on executive compensation.  Firms with executive 
compensation data are larger, on average, than firms for which these data are unavailable.   
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of INCENTIVE_RATIO would be associated with a 200 basis point increase in the absolute 
value of accruals over assets. 
 In particular, controlling for size, age, volatility and market to book suggests that our 
results are not driven by the more volatile operating environments of firms that use a lot of stock-
based compensation.  We control for firms’ book-to-market ratios in an effort to exclude a 
potential alternative explanation for our findings.  Smith and Watts (1992), looking at data 
aggregated to the level of industries, show that there is a positive relationship between firms’ 
growth opportunities and their pay-performance sensitivity.  Given that growth options are not 
directly observable, it is not possible to entirely rule out the possibility of some remaining omitted 
variable bias.  We do, however, find some corroborating evidence in Burns and Kedia (2004), 
who show that CEOs with more stock options are more likely to have to restate their earnings. 
Their restatement-based measure of earnings management is less likely to be contaminated by the 
presence of growth options.  
 The remaining columns of Table 2a fit regressions similar to equation (4.3) above, but 
using different measures of accruals and CEO incentives, as described in section 2.  The 
dependent variable in the third regression of Table 2a is the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals |DA| computed using the Jones Model.  The fourth regression uses a measure of accruals 
that is not subject to the problems around firm non-articulation dates.  This measure of accruals is 
based on data from statements of cash flows rather than balance sheets, as proposed by Hribar 
and Collins (2002).  The fifth regression returns to the earlier measures of accruals, but focuses 
on a measure of CEO incentives that explicitly models the ‘delta’ on the executives’ portfolios of 
options, following the techniques outlined by Core and Guay (2002).  All these robustness checks 
confirm our main result: CEOs whose exposure to their firms’ equity is higher lead firms where 
earnings management is more pronounced. 
Table 2b repeats the same steps using firm with more than $1 billion in lagged assets. In 
these large firms, the sample mean of accruals over lagged assets is lower, and the estimated 
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coefficients are smaller than in table 2a. However, because the data for large firms are less noisy, 
the results are at least as significant as in table 2a. 
The evidence in tables 2a and 2b suggests a direct link between earnings management 
and the financial incentives given to CEOs.  Together with figure 1, this gives us a consistent 
picture in the time series and in the cross-section.  In the next section, we investigate how CEOs 
exercise their options and trade their companies’ stocks around years of high accruals. 
3.2. Insider sales around high-accrual periods  
This section evaluates CEO option exercises and insider sales in periods of large and 
positive accruals.  Our results confirm and extend part of Beneish and Vargus (2001), who show 
that during periods when accruals are high, insiders sell unusually large amounts of shares, and 
that periods of high accruals that accompany large insider sales are followed by particularly low 
reported earnings and stock returns. Our contribution is to use a broader set of measures of insider 
trading, as well as data on option exercise.  Data on option exercise come from the Compustat 
Executive Compensation database, and are used for the period between 1993 and 2000.  The first 
measure of insider sales is the value realized from CEO option exercise as a share of firm equity 
market value.   The second measure is gross CEO share sales, as a share of firm equity market 
value; these data are based on the Thomson database.  The third measure is CEO share sales net 
of purchases, and the fourth and fifth measures are top-five insider gross and net share sales, 
again normalized by firm equity market value. 
 The first two columns of Table 3 show coefficients and standard errors, respectively, 
from the regression of CEO option exercise (normalized by firm market value) on a dummy 
variable capturing whether the firms’ total accruals were in the top 10 percent of firms in our 
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sample in that year.  Equation 3.2.1 captures the regression specification for the first columns of 
Table 317:   
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The first rows present coefficients from a regression 3.2.1 with no additional controls.  These 
results suggest that CEO option exercise, as a share of firm equity market value, is 3.82 basis 
points higher in periods where the firms they manage have levels of accruals that are in the top 
10% of firms in that year.  The second set of rows present the coefficients on the high-accruals 
dummy based on specifications that also include additional controls:  firm size, year dummy 
variables, dummies capturing the firm’s age, governance environment, the exchange on which the 
firm’s shares trade, and the industry in which the firm competes.  Adding these controls, the 
result is still economically and statistically significant: the value of option exercise as a share of 
firm value is 2.2 basis points higher at the high-accrual periods.   
The third set of rows present coefficients from a specification that includes, in addition to 
the variables mentioned above, a variable capturing the firm’s leverage and 10 dummy variables 
capturing the firm’s book/market ratio.  Adding dummy variables capturing the firm’s 
book/market ratio, the result is no longer statistically significant, with a point estimate of 1.74 and 
a standard error on that point estimate of 1.05.   
The reported specifications use the option exercise and share sales normalized by firm 
value.  This measure captures the intensity of executive selling activity in a given period.  We 
also explored measures of option exercise normalized by the number of options held by the CEO 
at the beginning of the year.  This measure controls for cross-firm heterogeneity in the intensity 
of option-based compensation.  The results are very similar to the ones presented in Table 3.  We 
                                                 
17 This decile-based approach follows Beneish and Vargus (2002).  Earlier versions of this paper presented 
results based on analyzing the top 10%, 5% and 1% of accruals, as well as results based on linear 
specifications. The results are robust to the particular specification choice.   
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also explored whether the tendency to exercise options during high-accrual periods was more 
pronounced for CEOs who were more highly incentivized with equity-based compensation.  
While the point estimate on the relationship between accruals and option exercise was higher for 
CEOs with more equity-based compensation, the difference in the coefficient between the high-
incentive and low-incentive samples was not statistically significant at standard confidence levels.   
The second column shows the results of three regressions using the larger Thomson 
sample and using gross CEO share sales, normalized by firm equity market value, as the 
dependent variable.  Again, the first row shows the coefficient on the high accrual dummy in a 
specification with no additional controls, while the second and third columns add increasingly 
generous sets of control variables.  The first row suggests that periods of high accruals see CEO 
share sales that are 19 basis points higher than other periods; controlling for year effects, industry 
effects, exchange effects, firm size, firm age, governance, leverage, and book/market ratio 
reduces the estimated effect to 14.7 basis points.   
The third column uses the same sample as the second and a different dependent variable: 
net CEO share sales, as a share of firm value.  Netting out purchases captures the true change in 
the CEO’s exposure to the firm’s performance; regardless of the control structure employed, the 
results suggest that high-accrual periods coincide with net sales of shares by firms’ CEOs.  
Finally, the fourth and fifth columns repeat this exercise for a broader sample of executives, 
focusing on the holders of the top five positions within each firm: CEO, COO, CFO, President, 
and Chairman.  Column 4 focuses on gross share sales, and column 5 on net share sales.  Again, 
the results are highly significant.  Periods where earnings are increased by accruals see 
substantially higher insider sales.  This result is consistent with the analysis of Beneish and 
Vargus (2002), although they use a different sample and different approach.18   
                                                 
18 Beneish and Vargus focus on the top five executives.  They create a measure of the net shares purchased 
(as a share of outstanding) for these managers.  They then create an ‘abnormal selling’ dummy variable, 
which is equal to one if two conditions are met:  the net amount of shares purchased for the firm in that 
year is negative, and the net amount of shares purchased is lower than the median of all firms that are in the 
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4. Conclusion 
The scale of the modern corporation makes the separation of ownership and control 
common, especially at the largest firms. Dispersed investor-owners rely on professional 
managers, who rarely own more than a tiny fraction of the companies they manage, to make 
investment and payout decisions. A manager whose personal financial stake is unaffected by the 
value of the company she manages may act in ways that, while privately beneficial, reduce the 
value of her investors’ claims. This separation of ownership and control has long been recognized 
as a root of corporate governance problems19.   
Partly because of concerns that managers’ insulation from their companies’ performance 
led to value-destroying executive behavior, during the 1990s executives became much more 
directly exposed to changes in their companies’ share prices.  This increase in exposure came 
through substantial grants of options and stock.  By the end of the decade, managers’ potential 
incentives to affect the share prices of their companies had increased dramatically. These changes 
were motivated by a desire to align managers’ incentives with those of shareholders, but our 
results suggest that they may have brought a new set of problems. Tying management incentives 
to the stock price may have had the perverse effect of encouraging managers to exploit their 
discretion in reporting earnings, with an eye to manipulating the stock prices of their companies 
We find evidence that more ‘incentivized’ CEOs—those whose overall compensation is 
more sensitive to company share prices—lead companies with higher levels of earnings 
management.  We go on to document that periods of high accruals coincide with unusually large 
option exercise by CEOs and significant unloading of shares by CEOs and other top executives.    
                                                                                                                                                 
same CRSP size decile and that have negative net shares purchased.  They find that the proportion of 
‘abnormal sale’ firm-year observations is increasing in accruals.  This approach controls for firm size, 
though not for other potential explanatory variables.   
19 See Berle and Means (1932).  Also Adam Smith 1776: “The directors of [joint stock] companies, 
however, being the managers of other peoples’ money rather than their own, it cannot well be expected, 
that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance [as owners].  
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If the insulated CEO, undertaking socially wasteful but personally beneficial projects, 
was an archetype of the 1970s and 1980s, then a highly incentivized CEO, manipulating reported 
earnings, may have become an archetype of the late 1990s. This does not mean that financial 
incentives destroy value on average, but it does mean that making the most efficient use of high-
powered incentives requires careful consideration of the their possible good and ill effects.  In 
particular, high-powered incentives based on stock price performance seem likely to work best 
when coupled with a careful consideration of managers’ opportunities to exploit these incentives 
through the discretion that they enjoy in reporting their firms’ performance.   
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Note. The left scale is for the balance sheet measure of accruals, and the right scale is for the measure using the statement of cash
flows. The measure using the statement of cash flows is robust to non-articulation events (such as M&As), but is not available before
1987. The construction of both measures of accruals is presented in details in section 2. 
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Fig. 1: Evolution of Accruals for Different Size Groups
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
absolute accruals over lagged assets (1) 4671 0.089 0.271 0.000 12.443
(1) using discretionary accruals 4671 0.081 0.268 0.000 12.311
(1) using accruals from stat. of cash flows 4671 0.106 0.641 0.000 41.151
INCENTIVE_RATIO 4671 0.263 0.239 0.000 1.000
INCENTIVE_RATIO using Core-Guay
measure 4640 0.216 0.248 0.000 1.000
lagged assets 4671 5.762 0.795 1.593 6.907
age 4671 17.251 12.279 1.000 50.000
index of governance from Gompers et al. 1182 8.551 2.661 2.000 17.000
volatility of sales 4671 0.099 0.104 0.000 1.223
book leverage 4671 0.447 0.235 0.016 2.628
Tobin's Q 4662 2.342 2.560 0.298 78.565
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
absolute accruals over lagged assets (1) 4199 0.062 0.054 0.000 0.871
(1) using discretionary accruals 4199 0.041 0.051 0.000 0.830
(1) using accruals from stat. of cash flows 4199 0.044 0.052 0.000 0.720
INCENTIVE_RATIO 4199 0.244 0.228 0.000 1.000
INCENTIVE_RATIO using Core-Guay
measure 4185 0.165 0.251 0.000 1.000
lagged assets 4199 8.220 0.970 6.908 11.994
age 4199 32.146 15.041 1.000 50.000
index of governance from Gompers et al. 1398 9.780 2.611 2.000 17.000
volatility of sales 4199 0.075 0.068 0.000 0.961
book leverage 4199 0.579 0.174 0.032 2.062
Tobin's Q 4194 1.879 1.486 0.435 23.077
Table 1a: Summary Statistics
Firms with lagged assets below 1 billion of 1996 dollars (sample for Table 2a)
Firms with lagged assets above 1 billion of 1996 dollars (sample for Table 2b)
Note. INCENTIVE_RATIO = ONEPCTit/(ONEPCTit + Salaryit + Bonusit). ONEPCT is the dollar change in the value of
CEO stock and option holdings coming from a one percent increase in the firm’s stock price. INCENTIVE_RATIO
assumes delta=1 for options. Core-Guay measure adjusts the delta of options.
Regression number
Independent Variables Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err
Ratioi,t-1 0.1164 0.0398 0.0768 0.0287 0.0743 0.0280 0.1038 0.0657
Ratioi,t-1 using Core Guay delta 0.0750 0.0320
Lagged log assets -0.0109 0.0042 -0.0126 0.0039 -0.0240 0.0071 -0.0119 0.0040
G <=6 (democracy) -0.0354 0.0110 -0.0385 0.0110 -0.0494 0.0214 -0.0398 0.0113
7 <= G <= 9 -0.0265 0.0081 -0.0311 0.0079 -0.0478 0.0143 -0.0320 0.0081
10 <= G <= 12 -0.0221 0.0083 -0.0296 0.0083 -0.0405 0.0146 -0.0305 0.0084
13 <= G (dictatorship) -0.0165 0.0088 -0.0200 0.0090 -0.0234 0.0148 -0.0186 0.0088
5-19 years listed in Compustat -0.0654 0.0287 -0.0672 0.0281 -0.1293 0.0700 -0.0674 0.0280
20+ years -0.0471 0.0167 -0.0466 0.0162 -0.0860 0.0329 -0.0477 0.0162
Volatility of Sales Growth 0.5097 0.2343 0.5147 0.2315 1.0556 0.6513 0.5217 0.2336
Book Leverage (one year lag) 0.0179 0.0132 0.0112 0.0128 0.0189 0.0190 0.0118 0.0132
10 deciles of Market to Book yes yes yes yes
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes
Exchange Dummies yes yes yes yes
48 Industry Dummies yes yes yes yes
Constant 0.058 0.007 0.122 0.025 0.120 0.023 0.201 0.036 0.069 0.010
R2
N
51 2 3 4
4640
Note. Standard errors are robust and corrected for firm-level clustering. Sample period: 1994-2000. Compustat Executive Compensation Database.
4671 4671 4671 4671
Governance Variables (omitted is missing)
Firm Age Variables
Other variables
0.015 0.077 0.082 0.050 0.083
Table 2a: Small firms (lagged assets below 1 billion of 1996 dollars)  Regressions of absolute value of accruals over assets on CEO incentives.  OLS 
regressions: |TAi,t| = a + b * Ratioi,t-1 + Xit’G + eit . Independent variable Ratio constructed as :  Ratioit  = Onepctit/(Onepctit + Salaryit + Bonusit).  Onepct is 
the dollar change in the value of CEO stock and option holdings coming from a one percent increase in the firm’s stock price.  
Dependent Variable Total Accruals over Lagged Assets Discretionary Accruals 
using Jones Model
Discretionary Accruals 
using Cash Flow Data
Discretionary Accruals 
using Jones Model
Regression number
Independent Variables Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err
Ratioi,t-1 0.0297 0.0068 0.0161 0.0076 0.0174 0.0071 0.0219 0.0065
Ratioi,t-1 using Core Guay delta 0.0163 0.0058
Lagged log assets -0.0036 0.0011 -0.0065 0.0010 -0.0064 0.0009 -0.0061 0.0009
G <=6 (democracy) -0.0017 0.0073 0.0035 0.0063 0.0001 0.0079 0.0027 0.0064
7 <= G <= 9 -0.0024 0.0050 -0.0001 0.0048 -0.0087 0.0044 -0.0007 0.0049
10 <= G <= 12 -0.0067 0.0037 -0.0064 0.0035 -0.0071 0.0035 -0.0069 0.0035
13 <= G (dictatorship) -0.0002 0.0050 0.0011 0.0049 -0.0091 0.0048 0.0007 0.0050
5-19 years listed in Compustat 0.0014 0.0067 0.0033 0.0059 -0.0009 0.0069 0.0027 0.0059
20+ years -0.0076 0.0062 -0.0065 0.0055 -0.0122 0.0062 -0.0073 0.0055
Volatility of Sales Growth 0.0913 0.0204 0.1239 0.0199 0.1135 0.0251 0.1256 0.0202
Book Leverage (one year lag) 0.0095 0.0086 0.0149 0.0077 0.0099 0.0075 0.0155 0.0077
10 deciles of Market to Book yes yes yes yes
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes
Exchange Dummies yes yes yes yes
48 Industry Dummies yes yes yes yes
Constant 0.054 0.002 0.069 0.012 0.066 0.010 0.080 0.010 0.069 0.010
R2
N
51 2 3 4
Discretionary Accruals 
using Jones Model
Discretionary Accruals 
using Cash Flow Data
Discretionary Accruals 
using Jones Model
4199 4199 4199 4199 4185
0.016 0.098
Table 2b: Large firms (lagged assets above 1 billion of 1996 dollars)  Regressions of absolute value of accruals over assets on CEO incentives.  OLS 
regressions: |TAi,t| = a + b * Ratioi,t-1 + Xit’G + eit . Independent variable Ratio constructed as :  Ratioit  = Onepctit/(Onepctit + Salaryit + Bonusit).  Onepct is 
the dollar change in the value of CEO stock and option holdings coming from a one percent increase in the firm’s stock price.  
Note. Standard errors are robust and corrected for firm-level clustering. Sample period: 1994-2000. Compustat Executive Compensation Database.
0.131 0.131 0.132
Governance Variables (omitted is missing)
Firm Age Variables
Other variables
Dependent Variable Total Accruals over Lagged Assets
Dependent variable
Regression number
Sample
Independent variable Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err
Constant 5.256 0.258 11.58 0.717 3.474 0.947 29.476 1.081 9.583 1.533
Dummy variable = 1 if accruals 
in top 10% of year
3.8210 1.0090 19.0970 3.8960 12.7760 4.8080 43.9080 5.2700 29.5290 8.1940
Additional controls 
Independent variable Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err
Dummy variable = 1 if accruals 
in top 10% of year
2.2080 1.0330 16.0540 3.9300 12.9490 4.9020 36.2330 5.2960 31.0530 8.2240
Additional controls 
Independent variable Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err
Dummy variable = 1 if accruals 
in top 10% of year
1.7390 1.0470 14.6900 3.8560 10.5320 4.8380 33.0540 5.1910 25.0860 8.1260
Additional controls 
N
Thomson FinancialCompustat Execucomp Thomson Financial Thomson Financial Thomson Financial
Table 3.  Option exercise and share sales of CEOs and insiders around high-accrual periods.  
3 4
40517
Total insiders net share 
sales as share of firm 
Constant, log firm size, governance dummies, firm age dummies, exchange dummies, 48 industry dummies, year dummies
Constant, log firm size, governance dummies, firm age dummies, exchange dummies, 48 industry dummies, year dummies, 
leverage, 10 book/market dummy variables
CEO option exercise as a 
share of firm equity market 
CEO gross share sales as 
share of firm equity 
CEO net share sales as 
share of firm equity 
Note. Standard errors are robust and corrected for firm-level clustering. Sample period: 1993-2000 for Compustat sample, 1996-2001 for Thomson sample. 
15654 40517 40517 40517
Total insiders gross share 
sales as share of firm 
51 2
nono no no no
